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The purpose of this Consensus Statement is to focus on implantable cardioverter-defibrillator (ICD) deactivation in patients with irreversible or
terminal illness. This statement summarizes the opinionsof the Task Force members, convened by the EuropeanHeart RhythmAssociation (EHRA)
and the Heart Rhythm Society (HRS), based on ethical and legal principles, as well as their own clinical, scientific, and technical experience. It is
directed to all healthcare professionals who treat patients with implanted ICDs, nearing end of life, in order to improve the patient dying
process. This statement is not intended to recommend or promote device deactivation. Rather, the ultimate judgement regarding this procedure
must be made by the patient (or in special conditions by his/her legal representative) after careful communication about the deactivation’s conse-
quences, respecting his/her autonomy and clarifying that he/she has a legal and ethical right to refuse it. Obviously, the physician asked to deactivate
the ICD and the industry representative asked to assist can conscientiously object to and refuse to perform device deactivation.
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Introduction
There is a large body of evidence demonstrating that the implanta-
ble cardioverter-defibrillator (ICD) is the treatment of choice for
patients who are at risk of sudden cardiac death due to ventricular
arrhythmias. Randomized prospective trials have established that
the ICD is superior to antiarrhythmic drug therapy in both
primary and secondary prevention. Eucomed data (http://www.
eucomed.org/) indicate that in 2008, ICD use, alone or associated
with cardiac resynchronization therapy (CRT), continued to grow
in Europe (14% more than in 2007). Implantable cardioverter-
defibrillator-implanted patients may later develop terminal illness
due to worsening of their underlying heart disease or other
chronic non-cardiac disease. Terminally ill patients are more
likely to develop conditions such as hypoxia, sepsis, pain, heart
failure, and electrolyte disturbances predisposing them to arrhyth-
mias and thus increasing the frequency of shock therapy. Shocks
can be physically painful and psychologically stressful, without
prolonging a life of acceptable quality, a result which is inconsistent
with comfort care goals. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider
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ICD deactivation when the patient’s clinical status worsens and
death is near.
Europe covers 10 180 000 km2, including 50 states, with a
population of 731 million people, 11% of the world’s population,
and it is profoundly pluralistic in its traditions, cultures, faith com-
munities, and legal systems.
The European health-care system is changing greatly, continu-
ously challenged by several important factors. Improved diagnostic
and therapeutic possibilities continue to develop, leading to an
‘aging’ society, with patients becoming increasingly older and
affected by several chronic co-morbid conditions. As a result, as
health-care professionals, we are faced with new important
ethical questions about if and when to withhold questionably
appropriate medical interventions or intensive treatments. Not
every European country yet has national legislation covering
advance directives or ‘living wills’, with some still debating the
subject. Even in countries that do have such legislation, advance
directives are open to very different interpretations and their appli-
cation differs widely across Europe.
Improvement of the dying process for patients with ICDs pre-
sents unique challenges to both patients and health-care providers
and is usually not an easy decision. Clinicians and patients rarely
engage in discussions about ICD deactivation and most devices
remain active until death.1 Existing guidelines have focused on
device indications, device implantation, and training standards,
but recently attention has2,3 turned to the technical, scientific,
and ethical aspects of device deactivation or removal, especially
in patients with incapacitating, irreversible, or terminal illness.
It is now necessary to develop a medical, bioethical, and legal con-
sensus for the ICD deactivation in such conditions, mindful that it is
relevant to two different categories of patients: those cognitively
intact and aware of the consequences and those cognitively
incapacitated.
The HRS/EHRA Consensus on the monitoring of cardiovascular
implantable electronic devices (CIEDs) stated that: ‘The primary
aim behind the rationale for deactivation must always be to
respect the patient’s right to live, or at least to die with dignity,
while limiting any therapeutic action that increases the patient’s
level of stress, pain or anxiety’.3 In addition to these crucial
medical values, the EHRA Committee for ICD deactivation will
follow key principles of liberal democratic societies, which
include respect for the diversity of values and cultures, equal
rights for all individuals, and preservation of fundamental
human rights.
End-of-life patients and palliative
care
The manner in which a patient dies is often managed by doctors
and nurses with family members as passive observers. Statistically,
one out of three deaths is sudden and totally unexpected, but the
remaining two-thirds are often preceded by a long illness trajec-
tory and the delivery of end-of-life care. Some studies have
shown that 4 out of 10 deaths have been preceded by a medical
end-of-life decision that has potentially or certainly influenced
the time of dying.4
The introduction into clinical practice of informed consent has
helped to involve patients and families in the management of
care. But, society remains uncomfortable with making any formal
arrangement related to dying and is reluctant to conspire with
patients in any way that might lead to premature death, since tech-
nical developments may greatly extend life. Consequently, about
one-third of patients die in the intensive care unit (ICU) in the
USA. In Europe, the situation is similar. Intensive care unit beds
comprise 5% of all hospital beds, but they account for 20% of hos-
pital costs. Moreover, the economic burden of the ICU will
increase in the next years because of the use of aggressive and
expensive treatments to improve the prognosis of patients with
very severe clinical conditions.
Faced with this trend, in the last 20 years, many authors have
reported a significant increase in the abstention or interruption
of life support. This behaviour, known as therapeutic desistance,
is applied in up to 65% of patients dying in the ICU. Four to
28% of patients in all care settings decline treatment prior to
their death. This attitude, once controversial, has been accepted
in clinical practice. It is a complex and difficult task to decide the
right therapy for a dying patient. There are different approaches
among health-care teams and there are even more striking differ-
ences in therapeutic desistance decisions. More importantly, in the
majority of cases, such choices are made only by physicians
without the involvement of patients and relatives. However, it is
preferable that families also take part in end-of-life decisions. At
the same time, documented choices related to resuscitation
wishes should be obtained, since the period immediately preceding
death is unsuitable for such discussions.5 –10
Palliative care should be extended to non-oncology patients,
such as those with refractory chronic heart failure and terminal
cardiovascular disease. Often inappropriate or intensive treatment
is given to patients who would greatly benefit from palliative care,
i.e. ‘an approach that improves the quality of life of patients and
their families facing the problems associated with life-threatening
illness, through the prevention and relief of suffering by means of
early identification and impeccable assessment and treatment of
pain and other problems, physical, psychological and spiritual’.4
Palliative care should include:4
(i) care for the patient and family or closest friends;
(ii) a multi-professional team approach;
(iii) relief from pain and other distressing symptoms;
(iv) attention to emotional, spiritual, and psychological, as well as
physical needs;
(v) maximizing the quality of remaining life.
Therefore, the strategies that should be followed by the whole
health-care team in the end-of-life care are as follows.11–15
(i) To engage in a reflection about death and to be accustomed
to the uncertainty of illness, so as to develop a personal
approach to death and the process of dying.
(ii) To improve communication skills, emotional honesty, com-
passion, and listening ability.
(iii) To create an appropriate environment (including a dedicated
room) where clinical information can be given to those
concerned.
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(iv) To involve the whole health-care team in the process of care.
(v) To be able to express personal discomfort, to choose the
tone of the communication which is preferred by the family,
to understand the real needs of the patient and his/her
family, and to understand when it is necessary to gather the
relatives together to discuss the situation and the possibilities
available to the patient.
(vi) To facilitate end-of-life care decisions, by relating to a specific
family member and not leaving the burden of decisions on the
patient and relatives. It is also important to provide infor-
mation relating to the procedures that may be undertaken
and to remind everyone of the patient’s wishes.
Basic principles
Are cardiac rhythm management devices
similar or different to other therapies?
Pacemakers and defibrillators are medical treatments and are
subject to the same ethical and clinical considerations as any
other treatment. However, their nature brings one to intuitively
question their similarity to other therapies such as drugs or
surgery. Indeed, cardiac rhythm management (CRM) devices all
need to be implanted into the body of the patient which means
that they are first, permanent, and second, inside the patient.16
This prompts several questions with regard to the possibility of a
different status for such devices and consequently the impact of
such a status on dealing with them, particularly at a critical time
in a patient’s history, such as the end-of-life setting with all the
adjustments that need to be made to provide optimal comfort.17
There are indeed several categories of devices which can be
classified according to: (i) the way they are powered: semi-
externally powered, such as ventilators, externally powered, such
as external pacemakers, intermittently externally powered, such
as some artificial hearts, and completely internally powered, such
as pacemakers, ICDs, and CRT devices; (ii) the way they can be
deactivated or withheld: some have an ON/OFF button or function
(such as ICDs), some have a variable output, below or above the
threshold for successful therapy (pacemakers), some can be influ-
enced by changing or withholding medication (such as anticoagu-
lants with artificial valves), and some are not adjustable (such as
atrial septal closure devices).18 This has a great impact on the
ethics of deactivating such devices, the principle generally being
that if the device has an ON/OFF button, then the physician has
the power to withhold such treatment on the grounds of futility,
even if the patient demands otherwise. On the other hand, the
patient has the right to ask for deactivation of a device if it has
an OFF button. In real life, however, both patients and physicians
underuse the principles of autonomy and futility in such
situations.18
One can wonder why CRM devices are seen as different from
other therapies. Some hypotheses have been considered which
are: the intuitive distinction between withholding and withdrawing,
when ethically there is none; the possibility of it being a permanent,
potentially life-sustaining therapy such as in pacemakers for
patients with complete heart block and complete pacemaker
dependency; its regulative or constitutive role, knowing that a
regulative treatment restores homeostasis, whereas a constitutive
one takes over a failing function and can therefore not be withheld
without rapid consequences for the patient’s health; and the fact
that it is inside the body and therefore calls for the patient to
have some degree of control over it.16,19
Some people have worked on trying to put CRM devices in
intermediate categories called ‘integral devices’.17 The two
extremes are the following: CRM as continuous medical interven-
tions: this allows the physician to unilaterally decide to continue or
withhold such a treatment on clinical grounds without the need for
the patient’s permission or request; and CRM as part of the body:
it then forbids the physician to remove it even following the
patient’s request.
The concept of integral devices is governed as follows: the
practitioner cannot unilaterally decide to deactivate an ICD and
do it against the patient’s will, and the patient can decide to
have his/her ICD deactivated at any time even if his/her doctor
believes it should not be done. It is based on the notion that
the device is not considered a vital part of the patient’s body
per se. Integral devices are not organic, not part of the body,
but internal, leaving more autonomy for the patient than with
external devices. Finally, the last proposition is to see CRM as bio-
fixtures.17,20 In this model, each patient should decide whether
his/her ICD is a chattel (i.e. impermanent) or a fixture (i.e. perma-
nent) and at the time of implant should be asked to designate
a status to his/her ICD, depending on his/her understanding of
the device.21
Are there differences in deactivation of
implantable cardioverter-defibrillators
and pacemakers?
Cardiac rhythm management devices, however similar in shape and
means of implantation, do differ in functions, the best example
being ICDs in comparison with pacemakers. Differences can also
be noted within antibradycardia pacemakers, with regard to pace-
maker dependency of the implanted patient. Thus, while general
agreement exists that ICD deactivation in dying patients may be
ethically permissible, especially if done to avoid uncomfortable
shocks, less agreement exists for pacemaker deactivation.22
Pacing, depending on the device settings, can be an ongoing or
intermittent therapy. It is not perceptible to the patient and is
therefore painless.3 Except in patients with complete pacemaker
dependency, pacemakers are not life-support devices. A pace-
maker, as opposed to an ICD, will not resuscitate a patient. But,
by preventing symptomatic bradycardia and the subsequent
failure of major organs, it will provide the patient with a better
quality of life and prevent worsening heart failure, therefore
meeting the goals of palliative care.23,24 The same reasoning
applies to resynchronization therapy by a biventricular pacemaker.
Discontinuation of pacing in a pacemaker-dependent patient has
an almost immediate lethal consequence and bears a confounding
analogy to physician-assisted suicide, thus needing due reflection
and interactions with the patient and the team in charge before
considering such an option.3 Indeed, in assisted suicide and eutha-
nasia, the cause of death is the intervention provided, prescribed,
or administered by the clinician. In contrast, when a patient dies
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after a treatment is refused or withdrawn, as after pacemaker or
ICD deactivation, the cause of death is generally deemed to be
the underlying disease. Anyway the practices and attitudes associ-
ated with pacemaker deactivation have been shown to differ signifi-
cantly from those associated with ICD deactivation22,25,26 and
there are countries where the deactivation of antibradycardia
pacing in a pacemaker-dependent patient is prohibited by law. It
is therefore crucial to be aware of the legal situation in the jurisdic-
tion in which you are practising.
Deactivation of devices can be achieved in different ways by
device programming.19 Implantable cardioverter-defibrillator
shock defibrillator function and antitachycardia pacing (ATP) may
be deactivated through re-programming, but application of a
magnet over the device will work just as well. A more passive
approach is to choose not to replace a CRM device which has
reached its elective replacement date. Surgical removal is not rec-
ommended as it is painful and carries potential complications that
are not desirable in an end-of-life setting.3
In deactivating a CRM device, it is also important to consider the
deactivation of the diagnostic, monitoring, and alert functions. The
deactivation of such features is distinct from the deactivation of
pacing and shock therapy and must be discussed with the patient
beforehand.3
Bullet points
† In assisted suicide and euthanasia, the cause of death is the
intervention provided, prescribed, or administered by the
clinician. In contrast, when a patient dies after a treatment
is refused or withdrawn, as after pacemaker or ICD deacti-
vation, the cause of death may be deemed to be the under-
lying disease.
† General agreement exists that ICD deactivation in dying
patients may be ethically permissible.
† The practices and attitudes associated with pacemaker deac-
tivation differ significantly from those associated with ICD
deactivation. It is therefore crucial to be aware of the legal
situation in the jurisdiction in which you are practising.
Logistics of cardiovascular implantable
electronic device deactivation
According to the HRS/EHRA Expert consensus on the monitoring
of CIEDs,3 deactivation should be performed upon the express,
written order of the attending physician. A previous consultation
with the patient’s cardiologist or electrophysiologist is necessary
to establish the specific therapies that are to be deactivated and
to assess the pharmacological treatment able to minimize symp-
toms of arrhythmias whatever the chosen setting of deactivation.
The cardiologist, cardiac electrophysiologist, or their trained
designee will program the ICDs in accordance with the order of
the attending physician and it is recommended to add in the
patient’s medical record the report delivered by the programmer.
The specific clinical setting of the patient needs to be con-
sidered. If, at the time of ICD deactivation, the patient is remote
from a centre with electrophysiology expertise (at home, in a
smaller hospital, or in a hospice), two possible scenarios may be
hypothesized. If the patients are well enough to travel to a clinic
with programming capability, an outpatient visit for ICD deactiva-
tion will be arranged by the attending physician, after a consultation
with the physician responsible for ICD programming. For patients
who are unable to travel, the attending physician should arrange
the recruitment of a professional expert trained to reprogram
the device and for a programmer to be brought to the patient’s
bedside.
Physicians may also request industry representatives to provide
the technical assistance necessary to deactivate the specific thera-
pies, after confirmation that the request is within the company
policy.22,27 Upon the specific, written order of an attending phys-
ician and under his direct supervision, industry representatives
can deactivate a device under such circumstances.
The physician asked to deactivate the ICD or the industry repre-
sentative asked to assist in the deactivation may conscientiously
object to and refuse to perform device deactivation in terminally
ill patients. Individuals should not be compelled to participate in
a clinical activity that they find morally objectionable.19,22,28,29 If
such a situation occurs, the attending physician must find
another physician and another industry representative to carry
out his/her request.
Deactivation cannot be regarded as a pure technical procedure,
but it is to be considered within the context of a suffered choice of
the patient, family members, and caregivers. Thus, at the moment
of deactivation, the patient should not be left alone, and we encou-
rage the presence of supportive individuals and even clergy, in the
case that the patient is a believer and his/her religion supports
his/her choice.
A specific problem is represented by those patients close to
death who receive repetitive shocks in the last few days, hours,
or minutes of their life,1 inducing unnecessary discomfort
without any clinical benefit. If deactivation cannot be arranged in
a very short time, the application, by the attending physician, of a
magnet over the ICD will temporarily suspend antitachycardia
therapies while not disabling antibradycardia pacing. In a few
devices of older generations, this procedure may be less simple.
Bullet points
† Deactivation, once the patient’s consent is obtained, should
be performed upon the express, written order of the
attending physician.
† The patient’s specific clinical situation should be considered.
† At the moment of deactivation, the presence of supportive
individuals should be encouraged.
† The physician asked to deactivate the ICD and the industry
representative asked to assist in the deactivation may con-
scientiously object to and refuse to perform device deactiva-
tion in terminally ill patients. In such situations, an alternative
physician or industry representative must be found to carry
out the patient’s request.
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Modes of deactivation
In order to prevent painful CIED therapy, it is usually sufficient to
deactivate the shock function of the device. This may be achieved
by completely deactivating all tachycardia functions (detection
and treatment) or programming the device to ‘monitoring only’
or deactivating only shock therapy while maintaining ATP
therapy.
In patients with terminal, untreatable heart failure as the cause
of imminent death, it may be reasonable to deactivate all anti-
tachycardia therapies, i.e. shocks and ATP, since any fast ventricular
tachycardia (VT) or ventricular fibrillation may lead to sudden
death without prolonged suffering. However, in patients who
are in a stable cardiac situation, and in patients with slow VT
(100–160 b.p.m.), VT may not lead to death but to severe or
aggravated symptoms. In these cases, the deactivation of shock
therapy alone while maintaining ATP may be preferable. Patients
should be informed that the rates of VT acceleration by ATP are
between 2 and 4%.30
It should be emphasized that the deactivation of antibradycar-
dia pacing functions in ICDs is usually not an option at a patient’s
end of life since: in patients with sinus node disease or complete
AV block, such low pacing rates might only add the symptoms of
bradycardia without significantly affecting the duration of survi-
val, i.e. the patient may survive as long but with a lower quality
of life.
In patients with devices capable of CRT, severe heart failure is
usually present at the time of terminal illness. Cardiac resynchroni-
zation therapy is primarily used as a symptomatic treatment in this
situation and therefore should generally not be withdrawn. It is not
evident in this situation that the deactivation of CRT has any
immediate or mid-term effect on the duration of the patient’s
terminal illness, but there is a risk that the patient’s quality of life
may significantly deteriorate.
Ethical and legal principles
Contemporary medical ethics embraces a commitment to key
principles of liberal democratic societies. These principles include:
(i) respect for diversity of values and cultures;
(ii) rights for all individuals to be considered as of equal worth;
(iii) protection of fundamental human rights.
In some aspects of health care, upholding these values can
prove difficult, for example, where there is an apparent conflict
between protecting a patient’s welfare and respecting his/her
autonomy. It is incumbent on health-care professionals to
ground their work in ethically defensible practices. The possible
deactivation of ICDs raises particularly testing ethical problems.
Even patients who have decision-making capacity (‘autonomous
patients’) do not have an unqualified right to demand that their
physicians provide any service or treatment. When making positive
demands to physicians, the concept of clinical need or appropriate-
ness is of great importance. A patient’s right to health care is based
on its being good or worthwhile health care, as judged by a pro-
fessional with appropriate expertise.
However, the professional judgement that an intervention is
clinically mandated does not by itself provide sufficient reason to
justify its instigation or continuation. Even a bona fide concern
for a patient’s welfare cannot support a decision to ignore an
autonomous patient’s competent refusal of consent. This means
that a patient may refuse the replacement of an ICD or make a
legitimate request for the device’s deactivation.
With regard to patients’ decisions concerning ICDs, there are
further good reasons to be doubtful that there is a single right
answer about what is the proper action in any case. Individual
patients’ preferences have been shown to vary widely, making
‘second-guessing’ a dubious exercise. This means that simply
attempting to predict patients’ preferences is unacceptable.
However, in terminally ill patients at the very end of life, the
continued functioning of an ICD raises particular problems, as
futile defibrillation is distressing both for the patient and for his/
her loved ones. A doctor is in the position to decide that external
defibrillation would be clinically futile, and thus ought not to be
given.
For the terminally ill patient with decision-making capacity,
therefore, it is crucially important that a physician responsible
for the patient’s care engage in a timely discussion with the
patient concerning deactivation of the ICD. This will allow the
patient to understand how a failure to deactivate can lead to
unnecessarily distressing death. The patient must receive
proper support to help guide him/her through the decision-
making process. As deactivation might not have been discussed
at the time of implantation, it is important that the issue be
raised sensitively and at an appropriate time with a patient who
is reaching the end of life.
Patients who are found to be lacking decision-making capacity
are in need of a surrogate decision-making process. This need is
carried out by two prevailing norms: substituted judgement
(aiming at depicting what the patient would have wished for)
and/or the patient’s best interest (what decision best promotes
the patient’s overall interests in their expanded meaning, and
not merely relating to physical existence). You must be aware
of the relevant legal position in the jurisdiction where you are
practising. Where possible, it is crucial that these treatment
decisions be informed by investigation of, and reference to, the
patient’s own currently or previously expressed thoughts and
wishes. If it is not possible to ask the patient, for example,
because of unconsciousness, discussions with family, loved
ones, and members of the health-care team may help establish
his/her perspective.
Although deactivation may seem a purely clinical question and
may hinge on purely clinical considerations, the peculiar nature
of ICDs—i.e. their status as integral devices—makes their govern-
ance an ethically more complex issue. Rather, careful communi-
cation about the need to deactivate an ICD in a patient who is
nearing the end of life, conducted in a timely and sensitive
manner, should be the standard practice. Equally, a decision to
deactivate an ICD in a patient who lacks decision-making capacity
should be carefully reached, without prejudice against the patient,
and with due regard to his/her loved ones and the concerns that
they might have.
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Bullet points
† Careful communication about the need to deactivate an
ICD in a patient who is nearing the end of life, conducted
in a timely and sensitive manner, should be the standard
practice.
† The decision to deactivate ICDs should be part of a well-
deliberated and transparent process.
† Ethical and legal guidance should be readily available to
counsel and support these difficult decisions.
† All patients, whether they have capacity or not, are due
equal concern and respect.
† Any ICD placement should be accompanied by a detailed
and documented deliberation, in which competent patients
should state their preferences as to the ways to handle poss-
ible future eventualities, including end-of-life issues.
† For patients without capacity, proxies for end-of-life
decisions should be sought (in jurisdictions where such pro-
cedure is legally accepted). Where this is not legally
accepted, decision-making for patients without capacity
must be made in accordance with legal requirements for
such decision-making.
Special populations: paediatrics
It may be presumed that children lack autonomy, and thus
decision-making capacity, but it is crucial that each case be
tested on its merits. A child may have such capacity, and even if
not, his/her views may still bear importantly on decisions. Child
patients must receive the same concern and respect that is due
to adults. In the case of decision-making for minors, the best inter-
est test is most widely used. This is partly because these individuals
may not have formed a binding decision about their preferences.
The best interest test is usually oriented to protect the physical
well-being of such minors, but it is appropriate also to consider
the patient’s values and overall interests where possible. You
must be aware of the law concerning decision-making by or on
behalf of minors in the jurisdiction in which you are practising.
The state has a legitimate role in protecting the welfare of chil-
dren, which may include placing limits on parents’ freedom to make
health-care decisions on behalf of their children. Where there is a
risk of great harm to a child’s welfare, courts have set aside
parents’ refusals of interventions, even where these refusals have
been based on deep-seated religious or moral views. Nevertheless,
in appropriate circumstances, and where the continued treatment
of minors might cause severe pain and suffering, courts have
accepted parental refusal of treatment or ordered its withdrawal.
Mature minors, even if they are under the legal age (a matter
that you must be aware of in the jurisdiction where you are prac-
tising), are gradually granted decisional rights. This in turn may indi-
cate the need to provide these minors a right to be heard, and a
reciprocal obligation to respect their articulated wishes in appro-
priate circumstances. Although age may serve as an indicator of
increased capacity, it is crucial to understand that a young child
may have capacity, and an older child may not. Each case must
be assessed on its individual merits.
Bullet points
† Unless medically indicated, requests for the deactivation of
an ICD in minors should be subject to strict scrutiny.
† The best interest of minors should be directed primarily
towards their physical well-being. As such, it will be rare
to find that the deactivation of an ICD is indicated unless
failure to deactivate is likely to cause pain and suffering.
† Mature terminally ill minor patients ( judged individually,
according to decision-making capacity) should be given
due chances to articulate their own wishes, in a supportive
and sincere environment.
† The process of accepting a request for the deactivation of an
ICD from parents or mature minors must be supported by
professionals with paediatric expertise (paediatric electro-
physiologists, psychologists, social workers, palliative care
physicians, etc.).
† Practitioners must be aware of the legal requirements in
their local jurisdiction regarding the legal situation concern-
ing decision-making for minors.
Making the process work:
communication
Communicating with the patient and
family
Information provided to the patient, what and when
Discussion with the patient and family about potential situations
where consideration might be given to the deactivation of the
device should begin prior to implantation. Indeed, device deactiva-
tion options should be included in the order of pre-implantation
informed consent. Anyway, it is important to raise this issue early
and preferably when the patient is in a stable clinical condition. The
discussion should be initiated by the physician and questions from
the patient and family should be encouraged. This will to some
extent prepare the patient for further discussion of the topic if
necessary at a later point.25 Discussions with physicians about their
experience with device deactivation indicate that patients may be
reluctant to discuss this topic even when they have advanced
disease.31 A survey of next of kin has suggested that doctors rarely
discuss deactivating ICDs with patients.1 Most of the discussions
which take place occur in the last few days of life. There are data,
however, to suggest that in cases when physicians have knowledge
of the legality of CIED deactivation, most would be willing to
discuss this possibility with their patients.26 Although it is important
to discuss the topic of possible deactivation, care also needs to be
taken to avoid painting too dark of a picture of this possible scenario.
At each visit to a device clinic after implant, the patient should
be asked about any changes in his/her general health, cardiovascu-
lar, and otherwise.32 New diagnoses and worsening of previously
known conditions should be noted. Additionally, patients should
be advised to have their cardiologist/electrophysiologist informed
about significant changes in their health status. The physician
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might even, in the event of such a change, advise the patient of the
right time to consider the deactivation of the device.32
When there is a significant deterioration of health status in a CIED
patient, a decision may be made to not resuscitate (DNR order) or to
provide palliative care only. It is imperative at this stage to discuss
deactivation of the device. In such cases, it would have been ben-
eficial if the physicians and patient have previously discussed the
possibility of deactivation, e.g. at the implantation of the device.
The medico-legal aspect of device deactivation needs to be con-
sidered in each case. A careful documentation of the reasons for
deactivation in the patient medical records is important.
Bullet points
† Device deactivation options should be included in the order
of pre-implantation informed consent.
† At the time of implantation of an ICD/CRT-D, the possibility
that the patient’s health may deteriorate to such an extent
that device deactivation may be appropriate should be
discussed.
† In the event of the patient having a DNR order or receiving
palliative care, a discussion about device deactivation should
be undertaken at the same time. At the least, the deactiva-
tion of shock therapy should be suggested.
† The physician following the patients with a CIED should ask
about significant changes in the patients’ health at each clinic
visit and ask to be informed of significant new diagnoses.
The conversation with the patient
Importance of a team approach
As the number of patients with implantable devices is increasing
exponentially and on account of a growing number of patients
implanted prophylactically without having arrhythmias, the role of
the electrophysiologist or device specialist as the patient’s main
caregiver is decreasing. Most device clinics are very busy with
most of the routine work done by technicians and very little time
for the physician to take care of issues other than device-related
problems. Follow-up is therefore shifted to the general cardiologist,
internist, or family physician. The electrophysiologist or the device
specialist may not be aware of potentially terminal diseases until a
relatively late stage; thus, the role of the other caregivers is becom-
ing critical. Therefore, a team effort should be initiated when the
patient is diagnosed as having an irreversible terminal illness.
According to the personal relationship with the patient, the
team member closest to him/her should usually be the one who
initiates discussion about device deactivation with the patient and
his relatives.
When the physician leads a conversation with the patient about
deactivating the ICD, it may be helpful for the patient to have a
family member present. It has to be documented in the file if the
patient is—in the opinion of the physician—able to understand
the discussion and emotionally able to make a decision, and that
he/she is legally competent. During the conversation, it should
be evaluated whether the patient suffers from a depression that
would explain an inappropriate desire to deactivate all device func-
tions and that may distort his/her judgement. In patients with signs
of suspected or overt depression, a psychiatrist should be con-
sulted to clarify this issue. Patients should be provided the religious
support they ask for and need in order to make choices based on
their own religious traditions, deepest convictions, and best
judgements.
Physicians should be aware that patients may have a great
amount of anxiety about receiving painful shock therapy but, on
the other hand, may refuse to even talk about ICD deactivation.
They may even regard this as an ‘act of suicide’ since the goal of
ICD therapy has initially been explained to them as a treatment
that saves their life.21 Therefore, it should be explained to the
patient that his/her survival time is limited by the terminal
disease itself and that thus withdrawal of ICD shock therapy is
both legal and ethical, and not directed towards life-shortening.19
This may be explained by analogy with the decision not to
perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation in a terminally ill patient.33
If the patient has not yet received an ICD shock, an attempt
should be made to explain how it can adversely affect quality of
life. Different modes of deactivation, shock therapy alone, deactiva-
tion of all antitachycardia treatments, antibradycardia pacing, and
CRT, should be explained to the patient and every effort should
be made to confirm that these differences are fully understood.
The physician should not persuade the patient to reach a par-
ticular decision. He/she may express his/her professional opinion
as a doctor who, in contrast to patients, is more likely to have
been confronted with this situation before. The physician must
be aware that the patient’s decision may differ from his or her
and that the patient may have a desire to maintain all ICD therapies
which may seem inappropriate to the physician.34 The refusal of
the patient should be included in the patient’s medical report,
but the patient should be informed that he/she can always recon-
sider his/her decision.
The decision to have the device deactivated can be difficult for
the patient, who should be provided with sufficient time to think
about the issue and to discuss it with his/her relatives. Consideration
should be given to offering the patient psychological counselling.
The results of the discussion should be documented. A copy of
the signed consent for deactivation must be included in the patient
medical report. The patient should be informed that after device
deactivation, he/she can always reconsider his/her decision and
that it is possible to re-activate all device functions.
Bullet points
† A team effort should be initiated when the patient is diag-
nosed as having an irreversible terminal illness.
† Different modes of deactivation should be fully understood
by the patient.
† When discussing deactivation with dying patients, one
should respect their autonomy and clarify that they have a
legal and ethical right to refuse it.
† Patients should be informed that after device deactivation,
they can always reconsider their decision and that it is poss-
ible to re-activate all device functions.
† A copy of the signed consent for deactivation must be
included in the patient medical report.
L. Padeletti et al.1486
by guest on June 4, 2016
D
ow
nloaded from
 
A multilevel communication
Importance of the family and shared
decision-making
Patients at advanced stages of terminal diseases tend to lose their
desire to control the situation and rely more on loved ones and on
caregivers in reaching critical decisions. The family’s role may be criti-
cal in helping the patients organize their thoughts and reach decisions.
Another role of the family is in situations where the patient is
cognitively incapacitated, and there is no pre-existing advance
directive. After having an official expert opinion on a patient’s
inability to make decisions, we often have to rely on the family
in trying to understand a patient’s previous will and attitudes
towards withdrawal of life-sustaining therapies, and what constitu-
tes appropriate treatment when approaching the end of life.
However, given potential conflicts of interest and lack of agree-
ment between family members, in such cases, a decision made
only by family should be supported by an Ethics Committee’s
approval whenever such committees are instituted.
A potentially problematic situation may arise when disagree-
ment exists between an incapacitated patient’s will, expressed a
long time prior to his/her current illness, and a different approach
perceived by the family to more accurately represent the current
approach of the patient. Such situations should be resolved by
an Ethics Committee decision, where required, or even a court
of law, according to the different jurisdictions. The patient’s will
always have priority over the family’s request.
Whenever applicable, there should be a detailed documentation
of the discussion with family, including detailed explanation of
prognosis, the potential harm of the device in the dying patient,
the fact that the disease rather than turning off the device will
be deemed the cause of death, and their approach (as well as
their perception of the patient’s approach) to device
deactivation.35
After reaching a decision to deactivate a device, family members
should preferably be present during the process of device inacti-
vation, with the patient’s consent/agreement.35
When to consult the Ethics Committee
or even a court of law
It is clear that a cognitively competent patient who wishes to have
ICD therapies turned off to prevent further suffering is entitled to
have this done.
When a patient has previously given a directive in the form of
DNR or DNAR, it has to be confirmed and verified with the
patient that this directive includes ICD deactivation. Once this
agreement has been reached, there is no obstacle to the deactiva-
tion of the device.
A problem may arise when one of the following situations exists,
which may warrant the need to consult the Ethics Committee or
even a court of law.
(i) An incapacitated patient without a living will referring to
end-of-life situations whose family is unclear or not in agree-
ment regarding the patient’s approach to such a situation.
(ii) When a family presents an approach that seems to deviate
from the original approach of the patient or his/her initial
directive.
(iii) Unclear cognitive state following psychiatric consultation.
Education
Although guidelines for the appropriate use of CIEDs are readily
available, there is a lack of medical and legal knowledge among
health-care professionals regarding CIED therapy in terminally ill
patients. It has been shown that more than half of primary care
physicians are not aware that unlike pacing the ICD shock is
painful to the patients,25 and many doctors and patients do not
know that it is possible to avoid unnecessary pain in dying patients
by deactivating the defibrillator function of the ICD. Furthermore,
according to a recent survey, nearly 50% of the physicians who
were not cardiologists or electrophysiologists were uncertain
about the legality of withdrawing ICD therapy in patients who
are reaching the end of their life.26 Awareness of these issues high-
lights the need for multidisciplinary educational activities regarding
CIED therapy in terminally ill patients and discussions should be
promoted by educational activities by EHRA and national societies
aimed towards general cardiologists, internists, family physicians,
and palliative medicine specialists, as well as towards device
specialists.
The key to any change of practice is ongoing medical, psycho-
logical, social, legal, and ethical education of all health professionals
involved in the care of patients with CIEDs (e.g. various specialists,
general physicians, fellows, and nurses), industry representatives,
and the patients and their families. Apart from the above consider-
ations, cultural and religious differences must also be taken into
account when planning educational activities for health-care provi-
ders, and the patients and their relatives.
In the context of rapidly advancing medical technology, which
may be inadequately understood by the patients and their
primary care providers, the implanting physicians and the phys-
icians in the device follow-up clinic have a key role in providing
practical advice on CIED therapy. They have the responsibility to
educate referring physicians and patients and their families on
the effectiveness, burdens, and benefits ratios of device therapy.
Other parties that have specific responsibilities include patient
associations, the device manufacturers, and regulatory agencies.
The responsibilities of the device manufacturers have long been
debated. Communication with them must occur at some point,
but they cannot be the main provider of educational information.
All educational material should be made readily available, e.g.
through the Internet, and it should be translated into local
languages.
The decision to deactivate CIEDs, even after clear instructions
from patients who are competent to decide, is known to create
anguish among the therapy providers. Therefore, continuing post-
graduate education opportunities focused on end-of-life care
should be made available to practising physicians, regardless of
their specialism. Trainees should be actively encouraged to partici-
pate in the conversations with terminally ill patients and other
clinicians.
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American perspective
The use of implantable cardiac electronic devices in the USA con-
tinues to grow. On the basis of expanding indications for ICDs and
devices providing CRT,36 over 10 000 devices per month are
entered in the US ACC NCDR ICD Registry.37 Although ICDs
are effective at prevention of sudden arrhythmic death, patients
will eventually develop other terminal illnesses, whether due to
their underlying heart disease or other disease. As the end of life
nears, painful shocks received from an ICD create an unnecessary
burden in the dying patient. The US palliative care literature is ripe
with editorials with titles such as ‘Dying and defibrillation, a shock-
ing experience’32 and ‘And it can go on and on and on.’38 All
describe patients receiving multiple shocks shortly before death,
many in the hospice setting, to the great distress of the patient
and the family. In a recent survey of next of kin of defibrillator
patients who had died from a single US ICD clinic, over one-
quarter had received a shock in the last month of their lives, includ-
ing eight who received shocks in the last minutes.1 Although pace-
maker therapy does not induce pain, nonetheless patients may feel
that pacing is an unwanted burden as the end of their life nears.
Thus, an awareness of the principles underlying the concept of
deactivation of CIEDs, as well as of the importance of communi-
cation between physician and patients and families of the option
of deactivation, is imperative to prevent undue burden of these
devices on dying patients.
Like Europe, the USA has a population of diverse cultural and
religious traditions, which may have varying views of the dying
process. Unlike Europe, however, the USA has a federal legal
system, with laws made by a single bicameral legislative system
and interpreted by a single judicial system, led by the US
Supreme Court. In US law, the concept of informed consent is
considered a most important legal doctrine, with its corollary
right to refuse treatment. The US Supreme Court has consistently
upheld the right of the patient to refuse treatment, even in cases
such as a ventilator, in which death would be near-instantaneous,
or of a feeding tube. Because many patients may long be mentally
competent to make decisions as they become terminally ill, in
every state in the USA, individuals have a right to name a health-
care proxy who will make decisions for them should they
become unable. Because these legal principles apply to the
patient, and not to a specific therapy, patients (or their surrogates)
have a right to request withdrawal of CIED therapy.39
Among US ethicists, the ethical concept of autonomy leads to
the conclusion that device deactivation upon the request of a
patient is ethical as well.22,40 On the basis of this principle of auton-
omy, the American Medical Association code of ethics obligates
clinicians to inform patients of all treatment options as well as
the right to refuse treatment.41 Further, the ethical concept of ben-
eficence requires that clinicians attempt to minimize discomfort,
which includes removal of treatments that a patient may find bur-
densome.22,40 Burden is defined by the patient, thus pacemaker
deactivation can also be requested, although a clinician may see
pacing as non-burdensome. Because the deactivation of a pace-
maker allows the patient to die of an underlying pathology
without the introduction of new pathology, ethically, it is not con-
sidered physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia, provided that the
intent of the clinician is to remove the burden. US law, as well
as ethics, does also recognize the right of an individual health-care
provider to refuse to perform device deactivation if this is contrary
to personally held beliefs, but does mandate that a treating phys-
ician aid a patient in finding another physician to carry out his/
her request.
Although most US device-physicians have been involved in
device deactivations, studies show that few patients with CIEDs
discuss device deactivation with their doctors.1 It is vital that phys-
icians be pro-active in discussing the option of deactivation for
CIED patients, from briefly letting them know that this is available
at the time of implant, to more detailed discussions as the clinical
situation changes and the patient’s overall goals for care may
change as well.
In summary, in the USA, both legal doctrine and ethical consen-
sus support the right of a patient to request the deactivation of a
CIED, and the obligation of a physician to perform this (or aid in
finding a physician who will). Although communication in the
USA between health-care providers and patients surrounding the
management of CIEDs at the end-of-life is so far suboptimal, it is
the hope that documents such as this and the US counterpart
will raise awareness about this important issue.
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